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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to reveal how representatives in negotiation are affected by 
emotional feedback of their constituency. The hypotheses predicted that representatives would 
not change their negotiation behavior after receiving happy emotional feedback from their 
constituency, and a more competitive reaction to angry emotional feedback, to wich pro-social 
and pro-self representatives were expected to differ in extent. To test these hypotheses, the 
social value orientations, and the in-group or external position of representatives were taken 
into account, and participants were tested in a mixed factorial experimental design. It was 
examined how representatives reacted to either happy or angry reactions of their constituency 
on a proposed offer to their counterpart, by measuring the subsequent adjustments they made 
to the definitive offer. It was found that pro-social representatives increased their bid, whereas 
pro-selfs did not. This implies a more advantageous bid for the in-group, but also results in a 
more competitive offer towards the buyer. Furthermore, both pro-socials and pro-selfs showed 
a negative adjustment in their offer after receiving negative feedback of the constituency, 
contrary to the prediction. Whereas pro-selfs proposed a more competitive offer on the first 
hand, this difference disappeared after the negative emotional feedback. It was concluded that 
happy emotional feedback is contagious to pro-socials since they are more sensitive to in-group 
emotions, and that future research is needed to examine the reasons what the reason is for both 
SVO representative groups to react with a negative adjustment to angry emotions expressed by 
the constituency. 
  
2 
The influence of constituents’ emotions on negotiation behavior in representative bargaining 
Master thesis 2015 – C. van Erck 
The influence of constituents’ emotions on bargaining behavior in representative 
negotiation 
Imagine you want to sell your car. You want it to go for at least 500 euros so you put it up for 
sale for 600 euros. Now a buyer offers you 400 euros. What do you do? This will likely be 
dependent on your character, but also on whether you think this person is nice, what you need 
the money for, whether it is your car or that of your partner, whether or not you know the buyer 
and how well, what the nature of your relationship is, and so on. There are a lot of factors that 
contribute to the way you will react. Due to all these different factors weighing in when 
formulating a reaction, the behaviors shown during these bargaining efforts have been found 
rather hard to predict. This has led to a substantive body of research investigating behavior in 
negotiation contexts. 
Generally, negotiation has been defined in two fashions. Either in a fashion of conflict, 
as “the process by which two or more parties attempt to resolve a perceived divergence of 
interest in order to avoid [or resolve] social conflict” (Gelfand & Realo, 1999, p. 722; Lawler 
& Ford, 1995), or as a means to achieve an objective, which is perceived as something that 
cannot be achieved without interaction with another actor (Faratin, Sierra & Jennings, 1997). 
The second definition does not emphasize on the goal of avoidance of social conflict, but rather 
on the fulfillment of personal interests or needs, like the example given about the car seller, to 
which a social conflict is not inseparably linked. Another distinction that has been made with 
regard to the definition of negotiation, is interpersonal versus inter-group negotiation. Dyadic 
or multi single agent negotiation has been defined as a means for agents to “communicate and 
compromise to reach mutually beneficial agreements” (Kraus, Wilkenfeld & Zlotkin, 1995, p. 
297), whereas inter-group negotiation comprises “groups of people who are attempting to reach 
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agreement (…), who often rely on individual agents to represent their interests, and to conduct 
transactions that affect the group’s welfare” (Gelfand & Realo, 1999, p. 722).  
Early negotiation research has mainly focused on the moves and countermoves, 
aspirations and goals during negotiation (Thompson, Neale & Sinaceur, 2004; Pavitt & Kemp, 
2009). From there, research has started to focus more on the cognitive aspects of negotiation, 
explaining different kinds of biases influencing negotiator’s behaviors, emphasizing on a 
difference between the rational expectations and the irrational behavioral responses shown 
during negotiation. Examples of explanations for this irrationality are cognitive biases that 
“presumably result from information-processing heuristics, such as framing, anchoring and 
overconfidence” (Thompson, Neale & Sinaceur, 2004, p. 8), social perception biases which rely 
on the same principle but are focused on “social objects, events and people” (p. 16), 
motivational biases which arise from “the activation of particular needs and goals” (p. 22), and 
emotional biases which “deal with misperceptions of one’s or others’ affect” (p. 27). These 
biases all lead to detours from what would rationally be prescribed as the ‘right’ thing to do 
according to economic principles, and hence form the starting point for a lot of studies. 
To provide a more systematic insight in what these divergences look like and how they 
come about, a lot of research has been conducted on the influences of for example power (e.g. 
Boles, Croson & Murnighan, 2000; De Dreu, 1995; Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005), differences 
between genders (Agarwal, 1997; Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005), emotions (Allred, 
Mallozzi, Matsui & Raia, 1997; De Dreu & Manstead, 2004), trust (Butler, 1999), self-interest 
(Curhan, Elfenbein & Xu, 2006; LeVeck & Hughes, 2014; Meyer, 1992), and cultural 
differences (e.g. Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Gelfand & Dyer, 2000; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). 
These studies were however mostly conducted in a dyadic negotiation setting and hence fail to 
account for the fact that most negotiations are held in a multi-group setting, rather than between 
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two or more individual agents. In this study therefore, an emphasis is placed on inter-group 
negotiation, during which the interest of the group is represented by a representative.  
The role of social value orientations in inter-group negotiation 
 In intergroup negotiations, the major difference with interpersonal negotiations is that 
the negotiators are not only influenced by their counterparts, but also by their constituencies’ 
pressures (Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012; Aaldering, 2014; Gelfand & Realo, 1999). Earlier 
research has shown how group features like prototypicality, attractiveness and accountability 
(Van Kleef & Steinel et al., 2007), trust, group status and detached constituencies (Druckman, 
2015) influence representatives’ decision making. Recently, inter-group negotiation research 
has mainly focused on the role of social value orientations (SVOs). SVOs represent “individual 
differences in how people evaluate outcomes for themselves and others in interdependent 
situations” (Van Dijk, De Cremer & Handgraaf, 2004, p. 698) and “is a stable dispositional trait 
associated with different forms of social behavior” (Aaldering, 2014, p. 44). People with a pro-
social trait are more likely to behave cooperatively and attain outcomes of higher joint value 
(Thompson, Neale & Sinaceur, 2004, p. 25), whereas individualists or pro-selfs “seek to 
maximize their own outcome, regardless of the other’s outcome” (Van Dijk et al., 2004, p. 698). 
In a group, pro-social individuals tend to self-sacrifice to benefit their own group if necessary, 
whereas pro-selfs do not (De Dreu, 2010; Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2013).  
In the light of this distinction, Steinel et al. (2009) looked at how group composition 
with regard to social value orientations of group members influences the decision making of 
the representative. They showed that hawkish (competitive) minorities tend to influence the 
representative’s decision making more than a majority of dovish (cooperative) constituents, 
resulting in more competitive behavior shown by the representative. This results in lower joint 
value outcomes compared to when representatives negotiate amongst constituencies that 
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comprise a low-status minority of hawks and a majority of doves, or merely doves (Aaldering 
& De Dreu, 2012). 
The role of emotions in intergroup-negotiation 
Since “emotion is potentially central to understanding how individuals think about, and 
respond to bargaining situations” (Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead, 2004) however, it would 
also be valuable to know how representative bargaining behavior is steered by the emotions 
expressed by their in-group. It has been found for example, that when negotiators feel anger or 
´negative affect´, they increase the use of competitive strategies and decrease concession 
making. Happiness or ‘positive affect’ on the other hand has been shown to increase concession 
making and cooperation (Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004). Van Kleef, De Dreu and 
Manstead (2004) also describe how negative emotions displayed by others serve as “a call for 
mental or behavioral adjustment, whereas positive emotions serve as a cue to stay the course” 
(p.511). In general, negotiators concede more to angry opponents compared to happy 
opponents, and even concede less to a happy opponent opposed to a “neutral” one. This often 
results in the obtainment of higher outcomes through the expression of anger than the 
expression of happiness during negotiation (Van Kleef et al, 2007). Van Kleef, De Dreu and 
Manstead (2004) showed that this is caused by the bargainer’s belief that angry opponents have 
higher limits than happy ones. 
The Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009) explains how this 
perceivement and interpretation of emotions of others occurs. The model describes that 
emotional information is processed through either emotional contagion (affective route) or 
through tracking (inferential route). Through the inferential route, information about feelings, 
attitudes, behavioral intentions and relational orientation are inferred from others’ emotional 
expression. This information leads to an affective reaction which in its turn leads to behavior. 
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Using the inferential route when facing a happy opponent for example, would lead him/her to 
think that the other person is satisfied with the offer, and act conform that inference. On the 
other hand, when emotional contagion (the affective, direct route) is driving behavior, people 
mirror the emotion of the other and thus directly feel and express the same emotion, without 
first inferring others’ intentions. These two emotional information processing routes could thus 
lead to different reactions as a result of the same emotional behavior displayed by another.  
Aaldering (2014) had yet another approach and studied how representatives differ in 
sensitivity to in-group emotion signals based on their SVO. She argues that representatives rely 
on their own social value orientation when assessing others’ reactions, which is explained by a 
structural assumed similarity bias: people expect others to think and feel the same way they do 
(Aaldering, 2014). She proposes that pro-socials are therefore more sensitive to the emotional 
reactions of the constituency than pro-selfs, and subsequently adjust their behavior more often 
to the constituency’s opinion. Aaldering (2014) also shows in her experiment that the 
negotiation behavior of representatives is mediated by constituent’s emotions, and that the 
extent to which the representative is influenced is dependent on the SVO of the representative. 
The way their actions are influenced by these emotions however, has so far remained unknown.  
The concept of group identification is closely related to and also helps explain these 
findings about social value orientation in this context. The group identification level of a person 
namely depends upon “the psychological orientation of the self, such that individuals define 
themselves in terms of their group membership” (Fisher & Wakefield, 1998). The degree of 
ingroup identification affects the amount of affective commitment and solidarity, which is 
“associated with a sense of belonging, psychological attachment to the ingroup and 
coordination with other group members” (Leach, et al., 2008). The affective commitment of a 
representative is thus indeed dependent on social orientation according to this theory. The extent 
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to which one identifies with a group is, amongst other things, affected by ‘mere categorization’, 
as is shown by the minimal group paradigm. This paradigm describes how people allocate more 
resources to the in-group compared to out-group members when people are merely categorized 
into a group by giving them a test and pretending to categorize them based on their outcome 
(Hertel & Kerr, 2001). 
Goal of this research 
Although the above presented insights provide some indications of the influence of 
constituencies’ emotions on representatives’ negotiation decisions and how these ‘pressures’ 
are affected by social value orientations of both the constituency and the representative, they 
altogether do not provide a concrete indication for the prediction or assessment of this action-
reaction relationship. Insight in the influence of constituencies through emotions on the 
bargaining behavior of representatives however, would provide valuable information for 
anticipation on behavior in negotiation practice since it does not only provide insight in the 
influence of non-observable traits like SVO, but also observable behaviors like emotional 
expressions. A theoretical contribution would moreover be made by showing how an emotion-
based perspective offers both an explanation for previously found irregularities in (group) 
negotiation behavior, and new insights about the dynamics of group negotiation for future 
research.  
The goal of this research is therefore to examine how representatives are influenced by their 
constituency during inter-group negotiations. More specifically, this study has the aim to 
examine how representatives with pro-social and pro-self value orientations adjust their 
behaviors as a response to emotional expressions of the constituency, and how these responses 
differ. To this end, this study will look at the way representatives adjust their initial offer after 
happy or angry feedback from their constituency. Furthermore, the study will account for the 
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possible differences between internally and externally appointed representatives, by looking at 
how the reactions of representatives differ when their interests are directly aligned with, or not 
directly aligned with those of the constituency. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the above presented literature, the following results are anticipated. First, the 
participant (representative) is expected to adjust an offer he/she proposes to the constituency, 
to a definitive offer when receiving angry emotional feedback from the constituency on the 
proposal. When he or she receives happy emotional feedback from the constituency about the 
proposal, it is expected that the offer is not adjusted after the proposal towards the definitive 
offer. Both forecasts are regardless of whether the representative has a pro-social or pro-self 
social value orientation or his/her representative role (Hypothesis 1). This is predicted since 
positive affect would serve as a cue to stay the course, whereas angry emotional feedback would 
serve as a cue for requested behavioral adjustment. 
When facing an angry constituency, pro-socials and pro-selfs are expected to adjust the 
proposed offer differently (Hypothesis 2). Pro-socials are expected to place a more competitive 
(higher) second offer as an attempt to satisfy the in-group after the negative feedback, since 
angry emotional expressions in general should lead one to believe the other has high limits and 
the offer was too low. Pro-selfs are expected not to adjust their proposed offer after negative 
feedback of the constituency, since they are assumed to be less sensitive to the emotional 
reaction of the constituency (Hypothesis 2a). Furthermore, both pro-social and pro-self external 
representatives are expected to adjust their offer less than ingroup representatives with the same 
SVO, since their interests are not directly aligned with that of the constituency, and they are 
categorized as an external rather than in-group party (Hypothesis 2b). 
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 These expectancies were tested in a 2 (representative’s role) x 2 (emotional reaction of 
constituency) mixed (SVO) design. Participants took part in a negotiation process as a 
representative of a group, were tested for their SVO and were asked about their motivation for 
adjustments of their offer and their commitment to complete the task well. 
Method 
To examine how representatives with pro-social and pro-self value orientations adjust their 
behaviors as a response to emotional expressions of the constituency, how these responses 
differ, and how the reactions of representatives differ when their interests are directly aligned 
with, or not directly aligned with those of the constituency, an inter-group negotiation 
experiment was designed. An experimental form of research was chosen since this allows to 
draw causal conclusions, and to examine what the effect is of an intervention or evaluation of 
an intervening occurrence (Mertens, 2014), like the emotions of a constituency. The specifics 
of the experiment conducted in this study will be described below. 
Participants 
Data of 107 participants was selected for analysis from the dataset1. These participants 
between 15 and 86 years old (M =25.60, SD = 11.22) and 80 of them were male. 73 participants 
worked or studied in the social field, 44 in the field of law and 18 in the field of economics. All 
participants were Caucasians and were recruited via social media or a university system in 
which participants can search for participation options for scientific studies called SONA. All 
                                                 
1 In total 235 people completed the experiment, of whom 18 were excluded because these participants could not 
be assigned to a SVO category. There were no other outliers detected, which means that eventually there were 217 
usable cases for analysis. A part of the cases was however conducted for a different research with the purpose of 
distinguishing between person directed from decision directed feedback. The participants who received personal 
feedback were excluded from the current research and will hence not be discussed any further. 
10 
The influence of constituents’ emotions on negotiation behavior in representative bargaining 
Master thesis 2015 – C. van Erck 
were notified beforehand that the reward would encompass a chance of winning one of the gift 
cards worth € 20 of choice, allotted among every 20 participants.  
Design 
All participants were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions existing 
within the 2x2x2 mixed factorial, the three independent variables were the representative’s role 
(member of the group vs. independent representative), emotional state of represented group 
(happy vs. angry) and SVO (pro-social vs. pro-self), which was measured at the beginning of 
the experiment and added as a post-hoc factor. The dependent variable(s) of the design 
comprised the offer proposal that the participant presented to his/her constituency, the definitive 
offer the participant made to the opponent after feedback from the constituency and the last 
offer the participant made after the counteroffer of the opponent. 
Procedure and Negotiation Task 
Simultaneously with the recruitment, the research was conducted online using Qualtrics, 
which took about 10 minutes average per person. In the experiment, first the informed consent 
was displayed which stated that participation was voluntary and that participants could stop at 
any moment they’d wish to. It stated that the research results are processed anonymously and 
that the goal of this research was to look at their negotiation skills2. This was done to avoid 
suspicion about the real goal of the research and to prevent socially desirable behavior as much 
as possible. 
After consenting, the participants filled in a questionnaire about demographic 
information (gender, age, country of birth, economic status and education) and completed the 
                                                 
2 They were asked to agree with these terms before continuing to the research program. If they’d choose not to 
agree, they were directly sent to the last page which thanks them for their time, and they were not able to complete 
the task. 
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decomposed game (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994) to determine their SVO. Subsequently, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of four (2 x 2) manipulated conditions: either the 
external or internal representative condition combined with the happy or angry constituency 
condition. Accordingly, the participants were instructed about the bargaining process.  
The scenario for both representative groups was that the group that was represented 
writes summaries of college courses and distributes those among students through an agent. 
Every year the price paid by the agent for a bundle of summaries had to be renegotiated. The 
minimum price for the bundles equaled the costs per bundle of € 200 and the maximum amount 
offered by the agent would be € 600, because a competing institution delivers same quality 
summaries for that price. 
The task of the participant was to negotiate about this selling price with the agent. In 
this negotiation, all representatives first proposed an offer to their constituency, after which the 
constituency sent an emotional response. Depending on the experimental condition, the 
response of the constituency was either happy or angry. The participant then got the choice to 
either adjust the offer by lowering or increasing it, or to leave it the same. After the definitive 
offer, the participant received a counter offer from the agent, after which he/she got to do a last 
counter offer. Subsequently, the bargaining process ended abruptly and participants were 
briefed about the fact that there was no need to finish the negotiation since all the data necessary 
for the experiment was collected. A flow chart of the task is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Flow chart visualization of the negotiation task procedure. 
After this briefing, participants were asked to fill in another questionnaire, asking about 
the motivation behind the adjustments made to the offer, about the expected goal of this research 
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(suspicion check) and degree of commitment, which comprised questions like “I was committed 
to the task”, or “I thought the assignment was easy”. In addition, manipulation checks for the 
representative role through group identification and perceived self-interest measures, and 
perceived authenticity of the constituency were performed to check whether the manipulations 
had the expected effect.  
Last, at the end of their participation, participants were debriefed about the actual goal 
of the research, the fact that the happy and angry reactions of their represented group were not 
real-time but pre-programmed by the researchers, and the fact that the € 20 gift card rewards 
would be distributed completely independent of one’s performance. The research’s full content 
is enclosed in Appendix A. 
Manipulations and independent variables 
The first manipulation was that of the role of the representative. The internal 
representatives (ingroup) were told that they were chosen to be a representative of their group 
based on their test results of the decomposed game. They were told that their chance to win a 
gift card would depend on their constituency’s satisfaction about the result of the negotiation. 
This manipulation was designed to strengthen the feeling of the representative that his/her self-
interest was aligned with the interest of the group, and the identification with the constituency 
to simulate a real internal representative’s involvement. The other half of the participants was 
told to be an external representative (outgroup), bargaining on the behalf of a yet existing three-
person group. They did not receive any additional information about the winning chance 
concerning the gift card, since the self-interest of an external representative is assumed not to 
be influenced by the group’s interest and therefore not by the constituency’s satisfaction in real 
representative negotiation situations. 
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Second, the emotional feedback of the group was manipulated for the second 
independent variable. The representative received a happy versus an angry response of the 
constituency to the proposed offer. These were manipulated by a pre-programmed chat 
conversation in which all the members of the constituency either all say to be happy or angry 
about the proposed offer. See Table 1 for the programmed reactions. These reactions were thus 
all aimed at the offer (not at the negotiator), but did not contain a reason for the expressed 
emotion, nor indicate a ‘direction’ to which the constituency members wish the representative 
to adjust the offer. The reactions of the ‘people’ in the constituency appeared after each other 
in the same screen with a delay of three seconds to strengthen the idea that the constituency’s 
reactions was real. This manipulation was expected to affect bargaining behavior of the 
negotiator through affection or interference with the emotions of the constituency. 
 
A decomposed game developed by Van Lange and Kuhlman (1994) was used to 
measure the social value orientation (SVO) of participants: to categorize participants as being 
either pro-social or pro-self. The of SVO of the participants served as a condition that was part 
of the 2 x 2 x 2 design and was treated as a post hoc factor in the analyses, and serves as an 
independent variable since SVO is a stable trait rather than a state influenced by the conditions 
created in the experiment. 
Dependent variables 
 Table 1. The happy and angry responses of the constituency on the proposed offer in chronological order. 
 Experimental    Reactions 
condition           
Happy 
“I have seen what you intend to offer the other group, I am happy with this offer.” 
“I like the offer, it’s going well so far.” 
“I have seen your offer, I am content with it.” 
 
Angry 
“I have seen what you intend to offer the other group. I am very angry about this offer.” 
“This offer really gets on my nerves.” 
“I have seen your offer, it pisses me off.” 
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The main dependent variable was the negotiation behavior of the participant (hereafter 
also: representative). The offers made by the representative were used as a measure for his/her 
negotiation behavior. The first (proposed) offer made by the participant, the adjustment of the 
offer made by the representative after the first emotional feedback of the constituency, and the 
offer made after a counter offer from the counterpart were used for analyses. This last counter 
offer was included to see whether there would be a latency effect of the perceived emotional 
reaction of the constituency on the negotiation behavior of the representative. 
The manipulation for representative condition was checked using the concept of group 
identification. Group identification was assesed using a questionnaire of 14 items based on the 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale developed by Luthanen and Crocker (1992). For this research the 
questionnaire was slightly modified and translated to Dutch, and had a Cronbach’s alpha of .94 
(M = 2.89, SD = .08). The full list of the original untranslated items is shown in Table 2 and the 
full translated list can be found in the research overview in Appendix A.  
Furthermore, there were two self-developed questions about perceived self-interest 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .55), and four for perceived emotional feedback (Cronbach’s alpha = .97) 
featuring statements like “Personally, I benefitted from an offer that is as high as possible”, and 
“The reaction of the constituency to my proposed offer was positive” respectively. The 
motivation behind the adjustments made to the offer was checked by six statements like “The 
satisfaction of the constituency was important for my decision”. Lastly, degree of commitment 
was measured using a self-developed scale of 2 statements: “The task was easy to me” and “I 
put effort into performing this task”. All manipulation check constructs were measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”), since a 5-point scale 
produces less noise as compared to a 7-point scale and the group identification questionnaire 
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was already developed as a 5-point scale. These scales were translated to Dutch and can also 
be found in the full research shown in Appendix A. 
 a. Item was reversed for scoring 
Last, to see whether the participants perceived and interpreted the emotional feedback 
as it was meant, a check was performed with the variables “the constituency was generally 
satisfied” (1 = “Strongly disagree” and 5 = “Strongly agree”) and “… unsatisfied” (same scale3). 
                                                 
3 Reversed for analysis. 
 Table 2. Collective self-esteem scale (Luthanen & Crocker, 1992) 
 Dimension         Statement 
Membership 
I would like to continue working with this group 
I do not enjoy participating in this groupa 
Private 
 
I often regret that I belong to this groupa 
In general, I’m glad to be a member of the group I belong to 
Overall, I often feel that the group of which I am a member are not worthwilea 
I feel good about the group I belong to 
Public 
 
I think the group I belong to doesn’t have much to be proud ofa 
I would rather belong to the other groupa 
I would rather not say that I belong to this groupa 
The group I belong to is a good representation of the kind of person I am 
 
Identity 
I feel good about the group I belong to 
I’m able to identify myself with the other members of the group I belong to 
I am the same as the other members of the group I belong to 
I feel little respect for the group I belong toa 
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Additionally, gender differences and other demographic features were controlled for using 
questionnaires beforehand, and the (aware chosen) motives of the negotiator, commitment, 
suspicion and perceived authenticity of the constituency afterwards. 
Results 
In this section, the results of the analyses performed on the data that resulted from the above 
described experiment will be discussed, and the findings will be mirrored against the hypotheses 
formulated at the beginning of the study. It was assumed that the proposed offer would not be 
adjusted after happy emotional feedback from the constituency, but would be adjusted after 
negative emotional feedback, regardless of the representative’s SVO (Hypothesis 1). 
Furthermore, it was predicted that both pro-socials and pro-selfs would place a more 
competitive offer when facing an angry constituency (Hypothesis 2), but that pro-selfs would 
do so to a lesser extent than pro-socials (Hypothesis 2a), and that both pro-self and pro-social 
external representatives would adjust their offer to a lesser extent than in-group representatives. 
Treatment of the data and descriptive statistics 
For the analyses, only the cases without missing values and within the right conditions 
were selected from the database. The means and standard deviations of the offers made by all 
included participants is shown in Table 2, which also shows that all offers correlated significant 
at the .001 level. 
Table 3. Means, SDs and inter-correlations of the offers made during each stage of the negotiation process 
Measure Mean SD 1. 2. 3.  
1. Proposed offer 475,86 95,39  ,70* ,66*  
2. First definitive offer 457,90 95,37   ,86*  
3. Second definitive offer 409,66 94,85     
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
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Manipulation checks 
To check whether the manipulation for emotional feedback of the constituency was 
successful, a 2 (constituency emotion: happy vs angry) x 2 (role: ingroup vs external 
representative) MANOVA was performed with the satisfaction scales as dependent factors and 
the emotional feedback condition as the independent factor. The results showed that participants 
in the happy condition experienced the reaction of the constituency as significantly more 
satisfied (M =3.54, SD = .51) than participants in the angry condition (M =1.41, SD = .62); 
F(1, 215) = 765.93, p < .001). This indicates that the emotional feedback manipulation was 
successful. 
A second check was performed to see whether participants were influenced by the 
different instructions for representative role. A 1 (means variable for group identification) x 2 
(representative role) ANOVA, showed that the expected difference between internal and 
external representatives for group identification did not exist (F < 1), which means that the 
manipulation for the representative roles was unsuccessful. These findings were confirmed by 
a 3 (offers: proposed offer, first definitive offer, second definitive offer) x 2 (representative 
role) x 2 (emotional feedback) x 2 (SVO) Repeated Measures ANOVA. The effect of 
representative conditions on the offers made by the representatives was found insignificant in 
this test (F < 1). The means for the different conditions of representatives are therefore not 
specified in Table 3 and results for representative conditions will therefore not be discussed in 
the rest of this article’s section, and hence Hypothesis 2b is discarded. 
Hypothesis testing 
To test the hypotheses that representatives would not significantly adjust their proposed 
offer after positive emotional feedback but would significantly adjust their proposal after 
negative emotional feedback, and that pro-social representatives would show a larger response 
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than pro-selfs, a 3 (offers) x 2 (representative role) x 2 (emotional feedback) x 2 (SVO) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA was performed. The repeated measurements factor was found 
significant (F(2, 208) = 124.63, p < .001, ƞ2 = .55), which means that there was a significant 
difference between some or all offers. The results further revealed a significant main effect of 
emotion, F(2, 208) = 16.10, p < .001, ƞ2 = .13, and a significant interaction effect of emotion 
and SVO with the amounts offered, F(2, 208) = .3.16, p = .04, ƞ2 = .03, which practically means 
that there was an effect of one or more dependent variables (SVO, emotional feedback, 
representative condition) on the independent variable (the offers). The main effect of SVO on 
amounts offered was found marginally significant (F(2, 208) = 2.93, p = .06, ƞ2 = .03), which 
shows that for one or more differences between offers, the effect is significantly related to the 
SVO participants have. All other tested effects were found non-significant. This confirms the 
previous discard of Hypothesis 2b. 
Subsequently, post hoc analyses were performed to assess the details of the found effects 
of the above described Repeated Measures ANOVA, since this data was still too general to 
draw conclusions from that confirm the hypotheses. A regular post-hoc analysis however could 
not be queried because the amount of manipulations used in the analysis is too small, namely 
two (emotional feedback: happy vs angry) instead of more than two. Therefore, to test the 
hypothesis that positive constituency feedback does not lead to adjustment, but angry emotional 
feedback does, the post hoc results were obtained by splitting the file for the different emotional 
feedback conditions. To this end, difference scores between the offers proposed/made were 
used to analyze the modification of the offer after hearing the feedback of the constituency. 
These were then tested using a 2 (difference scores: proposed offer vs first definitive offer, and 
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first definitive offer vs second definitive offer) x 2 (SVO) x 2 (representative role) x 2 
(emotional feedback) ANOVA with the proposed offer added as a covariate4.  
Figure 2 shows that representatives significantly lower their proposed offer (M =474.22, 
SD = 91.55) before placing the definitive first offer (M =430.55, SD = 83.86) after receiving 
an angry response from the constituency (F(1, 105 = 58.28, p < .01, ƞ2 = .36), which indicates 
that there was a negative effect of the negative feedback on the adjustment of the offer, as was 
predicted by Hypothesis 2a. A second 1 (difference score between first and second definitive 
offer) x 2 (SVO) x 2 (representative role) x 2 (emotional feedback) ANOVA with the first 
definitive offer as a covariate, to test whether there was a continuation effect of the emotional 
response of the constituency. There was a significant negative difference found between the 
first definitive offer (M =430.55, SD = 83.86) and the second definitive offer (M =381.57, SD 
= 82.78; F(1, 105) = 17.63, p < .01, ƞ2 = .14) for representatives with an angry constituency, 
meaning that these representatives lowered their offer when making it definitive as a result of 
the negative emotional feedback of their constituency. 
The results for representatives with a happy constituency are also shown in Figure 2. 
The analysis shows that they did not adjust the proposed offer significantly to the definitive 
offer (F(1, 108) = 2.54, p = n.s.). They did however significantly negatively adjust the first 
definitive offer (M =484.49, SD = 98.66) to the second definitive offer (M =436.97, SD = 
98.16; F(1, 108) = 5.13, p<.05, η2 = .05), which could be interpreted as a negative effect of the 
emotional feedback given after the proposal round. Although these findings support the first 
hypothesis that the proposed offer is generally only adjusted after negative emotional feedback 
                                                 
4Since participants that propose a low offer have less room to make concessions when making the first definitive 
offer, an participants that propose a high offer have less room to offer something more competitive, there must be 
controlled for the modification of the intended offer. Therefore, the proposed offer is added as a covariate.  
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from the constituency, and not after happy feedback, a solid conclusion regarding a continuation 
effect of emotion between the two definitive offers cannot be stated. Whereas the 
representatives of an angry constituency seem to continue their adjustments almost linearly, 
which could be an indicator for a continuation effect, representatives of a happy constituency 
follow a very similar negative trend between the two definitive offers, after a (although 
insignificant) positive adjustment between the proposed and first definitive offer. The tendency 
to lower the offer in the second ‘real’ offering round is therefore more likely to be a result of 
the counter offer made by the counterpart, rather than a continuation effect of the emotional 
feedback received. 
 
Figure 2. The main effects of emotional feedback given by the constituency on offers made 
To not only look separately at, but also compare representatives’ reactions when facing 
a happy versus an angry constituency, a 3 (three offers) x 2 (emotional condition) Repeated 
Measures ANOVA was performed. This showed that representatives in the happy constituency 
condition did not make significantly higher offers in the offer proposal phase where emotional 
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feedback was not yet manipulated (F < 1). After receiving happy emotional feedback however, 
they made significantly higher (more competitive) offers after the constituency’s feedback (M 
=484.49, SD = 98.66) compared to participants with an angry constituency (M = 430.55, SD = 
83.86; F(1, 209) = 14.18, p<.01, η2 = .06). This means that, although the difference between the 
proposed and the definitive offer might not have been large enough for a significant result, in 
the end representatives with a happy constituency did make significant higher offers than the 
ones with an angry constituency. The second definitive offer of representatives of a happy 
constituency was also significantly higher (M =436.97, SD = 98.16) than that of representatives 
with an angry constituency (M =381.57, SD = 82.78; F(1, 209) = 15.38, p < .01. η2 = .07). This 
is also visible in Figure 2, and shows that although representatives with a happy constituency 
did not change their offer significantly, they did, in contrast to representatives of an angry 
constituency, make a significantly more competitive offer after the feedback compared to 
representatives of an angry constituency. Or, as one could also state, representatives facing an 
angry constituency adjusted their offer to a significantly lower definitive offer than 
representatives facing a happy constituency. 
To test Hypothesis 2a, which assumed that pro-socials and pro-selfs would both place a 
more competitive bid after negative feedback but that the extent to which they alter the offer 
would differ, a 1 (difference score of the proposed and first definitive offers) x 2 (SVO) x 2 
(representative role) x 2(emotional feedback) ANOVA with the proposed offer as covariate 
showed that pro-socials in the angry condition adjusted their proposed offer (M =457.40, SD = 
93.42) negatively to their definitive offer (M =424.48, SD = 87.03; F(1, 56) = 28.64, p <.01, η2 
= .34), whereas they made a positive adjustment from the first definitive offer (M =494.14, SD 
= 86.02) to their second, counteroffer (M =437.73, SD = 80.26) when facing a happy 
constituency, F(1, 37) = 5.47, p < .05, η2 = .13. These results partially gainsay the expectations 
22 
The influence of constituents’ emotions on negotiation behavior in representative bargaining 
Master thesis 2015 – C. van Erck 
of Hypothesis 1, since there was a positive effect of happy emotional feedback among pro-
socials. They also counter Hypothesis 2a partially, since pro-socials adjusted their offer 
proposal negatively after angry feedback, instead of positively or more competitive as was 
predicted. 
Pro-selfs also negatively adjusted their proposed offer (M = 456.54, SD = 89.80) to their 
definitive offer (M =466.79, SD = 83.84) after receiving angry feedback, F(1, 47) = 26.33, p < 
.01, η2 = .36. In the happy feedback condition however, pro-self representatives did not adjust 
their offer significantly (F < 1). These findings contradict the hypothesis that representatives 
would place a more competitive offer after negative feedback, and contrarily shows that 
representatives of both SVO’s placed less competitive offers as a reaction to these emotions. 
These results are displayed in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 3. Differences for SVO groups in offered amount of money in angry constituency condition 
Moreover, an ANOVA for every offer round with social value orientation as the 
independent variable was performed to explore the main effect for SVO. It showed that during 
the first round pro-selfs proposed a significantly more competitive offer (M =491.05, SD = 
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96.12) than did pro-socials (M =457.05, SD = 91.51; F(1, 209) = 6.48, p<.01, η2 = .03). This 
difference between social value orientation groups disappeared during the first (F(1, 209) = 
2.00, p = n.s.) and second definitive offer (F < 1). This does indicate that pro-social 
representatives adjusted their offers more competitive relative to pro-selfs, which provides 
support for the idea that pro-social representatives react more competitively to negative 
emotional feeback compared to pro-selfs.  
 
Figure 4. Differences for SVO groups in offered amount of money in happy constituency condition 
 The same ANOVA was performed for the difference score of the two definitive 
offers with the first definitive offer as covariate. This showed that pro-socials adjusted their 
second offer (M =424.48, SD = 87.03) negatively to a third offer (M =385.95, SD = 87.15; F(1, 
56) = 7.45, p < .01, η2 = .12) when having received angry feedback. They however did not 
adjust their offer in the third round significantly in the happy constituency condition (F < 1). 
Pro-selfs similarly adjusted their second offer (M =437.73, SD = 80.26) negatively to a third 
offer (M =376.41, SD = 77.88), and they did adjust their third offer (M =447.99, SD = 103.24) 
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negatively compared to their second offer (M =494.23, SD = 105.22; F(1, 69) = 4.74, p = .03, 
η2 = .06). This indicates that there is an overall trend for negative adjustment from the first to 
the second definitive offer, after receiving a counter offer from the counterpart. 
It also indicates that there is likely not a continuation effect of the emotional feedback 
received, since the trends would then be similar to those found between offers 1 and 2, rather 
than a general negative trend. An overview of all values is provided in Table 4, to give an 
overview of how the values related to each other. 
 
Last, although this does not directly contribute to the hypotheses but is valuable to 
report, is a post hoc test for the significant main effect for SVO. This showed that pro-social 
representatives generally negatively adjusted their first offer (M =457.05, SD = 91.51) after 
feedback to their second offer (M =441.49, SD = 87.83; F(1,95) = 28.65, p<.01, ƞ2 = .23). Pro-
selfs also significantly lowered their first offer (M =491.06, SD = 96.13) towards their second 
offer (M =471.16, SD = 99.44; F(1,118) = 12.10, p < .01, η2 = .09), and showed as previously 
discussed that pro-self representatives offered significantly higher in the first (F(1, 216) = 7.01, 
p < .01), and during in the second (F(1, 216) = 5.29, p = .02), but not the third (F(1, 216) = 
2.49, p = n.s.) offering rounds. Pro-socials also lowered the last definitive offer (M =398.40, 
SD = 87.51) relative to the first definitive offer and pro-selfs showed a similar adjustment 
 Table 4. Means and standard deviations of offers 1, 2 and 3 for every condition 
 
Angry constituency  Happy constituency 
Pro-social  
M (SD) 
Pro-self 
M (SD) 
  Pro-social 
M (SD) 
Pro-self 
M (SD) 
Proposed 
offer 
457.40 (93.42) 494.14 (86.02)  
 
456.54 (89.80) 488.93 (103.07) 
1st definitive 
offer 
424.48 (87.03) 437.73 (80.26)  
 
466.79 (83.84) 494.23 (105.22) 
2nd definitive 
offer 
385.95 (87.15) 376.41 (77.88)  
 
416.92 (85.83) 447.99 (103.24) 
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towards the last definitive offer (M =418.76, SD = 99.82; F(1,118) = 7.88, p < .01, η2 = .06). 
This confirms the knowledge that pro-selfs tend to make more competitive offers in general. 
Discussion 
Negotiation often takes place in group settings where representatives bargain on their groups’ 
behalf. Whereas representative negotiation has been a central topic in many studies, there has 
so far been no attention for how emotional feedback of constituencies is perceived and acted 
upon by representatives, and thereby modify the bargain’s outcome. This research has therefore 
looked at how emotional feedback given by a constituency influences the bargaining behavior 
of representatives during negotiation. It integrated existing literature to formulate two main 
hypotheses. The first was that representatives would show a response in bargaining behavior to 
negative but not to positive emotional feedback of the constituency. This hypothesis was based 
on the knowledge that positive affect serves as a cue to stay the course, whereas negative affect 
is a cue for adjustment of behavior.  
Furthermore, it was expected that both pro-social and pro-self representatives would place 
a more competitive offer after an angry emotional expression of the constituency, because the 
constituency would be perceived to have higher limits than represented by the proposed offer. 
This hypothesis followed from the knowledge that people that display angry emotions are 
perceived to have higher limits. A second point that was considered during the formulation of 
this hypothesis is that pro-social representatives tend to serve the in-group’s interests, whereas 
pro-selfs tend to represent their own interests. Since the own and group interests were aligned 
apart from the representative manipulation in which both SVO groups were homogeneously 
represented, pro-socials and pro-selfs were expected to react similarly. Pro-selfs were however 
expected to be less affected by the constituency’s emotional feedback than pro-social ones, and 
thus to adjust their offer to a lesser extent. Moreover, based on the social identity theory and 
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the fact that their interests differed from that of the group, external representatives were 
expected to be less engaged with the constituency and hence adjust their offer less than in-group 
representatives.  
During a 2 (representative role) x2 (emotional feedback of constituency; happy vs. angry) 
x2 (SVO) mixed factorial design experiment, Hypothesis 1 was partially confirmed, since 
participants that faced a happy constituency after they proposed an offer generally did not 
significantly adjust their offer but representatives with an angry constituency did. Whereas this 
effect was the same for pro-self representatives however, it did not hold with regard to pro-
social representatives, who heightened their offer significantly after receiving positive 
emotional feedback from their constituency. A possible explanation for this might be provided 
by the EASI model of Van Kleef (2009) combined with the findings of Aaldering (2014) that 
pro-socials are more sensitive to constituency emotions than pro-selfs. One could argue that 
that pro-social representatives were affected by the positive emotion of the constituency through 
the inferential route, which means that they interpreted the happy emotional feedback as an 
encouragement to place a more competitive offer. More likely however, seems to be the 
explanation that pro-social representatives processed the emotional information via the 
affective route, hereby copying the happy feeling expressed by the constituency and 
consequently reacting with euphoria resulting in a more dared, higher offer. When adding this 
to the notion of Aaldering (2014) that pro-socials are more sensitive to others’ emotions, the 
fact that solely pro-socials made more competitive offers after happy feedback would be 
explained. 
Hypothesis 2 on the other hand, was not confirmed but rather proven contrary, since both 
pro-social and pro-self representatives made significantly less instead of more competitive 
offers after they were given negative emotional feedback by their constituency. Whereas they 
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were expected to interpret the angry reaction of the constituency as an expression of higher 
limits, other explanations might be more relevant. A first possible explanation could be, that 
the representatives already placed bids so close to the highest possible offer, since 51.6% placed 
an initial offer of 500 or higher, 32.7% proposed an offer of 550 or higher, and 17.5% proposed 
an offer of 600. This might have caused that angry emotional feedback could not be interpreted 
differently than that the offer was too high instead of too low, and thus that the alteration of 
behavior automatically resulted in a lowering of the offer. The constituency also did not give a 
reason (direction) for their emotion, which left room for this ambiguity. 
An alternative explanation would be that also in this case Van Kleef’s (2009) model 
provides an answer for these findings, namely that the affective route was more dominant than 
the inferential route, leading representatives to feel angry instead of making the inference that 
one wants them to make a higher offer. This might have led to ‘punishing’ behavior or 
detachment of the in-group and thereby expressing carelessness by lowering the offer. This is 
rather speculative however, and needs to be further researched. Why this reaction is the same 
for pro-social and pro-self representatives also remains unexplained. Both could have different 
reasons, or the same reasons for lowering their offers. 
The hypothesis that pro-social representatives would be more sensitive to and hence act 
more intense on emotional feedback than pro-self representatives, was not proven in this sense. 
The negative emotional reaction of the constituency seems to have overridden the results 
expected based on SVO, since the differences in offers between pro-socials and pro-selfs did 
not increase but instead decreased to such a degree that they did not differ significantly from 
each other anymore. What did become visible however, is that pro-socials acted differently 
from pro-selfs by acting more conform group interests by lowering the offer less than pro-self 
representatives did. This does not however explain why both representative groups decided to 
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lower their offer, and also does not provide a clear picture about or explanation for the 
differences found between the way pro-social and pro-self representatives are influenced by 
emotions expressed by the constituency. 
Fourthly, the manipulation for representative condition where representatives were either 
said to be dependent on the outcome and part of the in-group, versus independent on the 
outcome and an external party, turned out not to be effective. Whereas the prediction was built 
on the expectation that mere categorization would lead to a stronger feeling of belonging with 
the in-group for in-group representatives, the identification of external representatives was 
equally high. This either indicates a relatively low group identification of in-group 
representatives or a relatively high group identification of external representatives. Since the 
average overall identification score was 3.38 on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high) where 3 is neutral,  
indicates that the first assumption is most likely. This means that the identification of in-group 
representatives was likely not well enough enhanced. Looking at the manipulation, the problem 
might have been that the research was not conducted among true groups but rather consisted of 
pre-programmed  reactions, but also that there was no connection because people did not see or 
know any features of their group members and that the task might have been too fuzzy which 
led to confusion. These suspicions were confirmed by the reactions of the respondents when 
asked if they had remarks at the end of the research. One of the participants stated “It was not 
clear to me what group I represented in this research. Had this been clear to me, I might have 
made different offers”, and another stated “The problem is that there is no true group bonding. 
Furthermore, the reactions of the constituency were weird. After their first feedback there is 
therefore no connection with the constituency anymore” and some gave the feedback that they 
felt the group’s reactions were pre-programmed and that this influenced their reactions: “It was 
clear that there were no true group members and that the reactions were not real.” Mere 
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categorization as performed in this research therefore seems insufficient, and the task too 
ambiguous. The recommendation for future research therefore, is to either create a group that 
people can relate to by providing features of members, or conduct the experiment in a real-life 
setting. Apart from the examination of the differences between in-group and external 
representatives, this may also provide more reliable results for the research overall. Considering 
the task explanations, the language used might have been too complex for some of the 
participants and the tasks too fuzzy, which is something that is recommended to be minded in 
general since this also influences the results in a way that is not desirable. 
Last, the third offer round was added to test for a continuation effect of the emotional 
feedback of the constituency. Although almost all third offers were significantly adjusted 
negatively compared to the second offers, an ANOVA for the difference scores with emotion 
as the independent factor and the first definitive offer as a covariate, showed that there was no 
significant effect of emotion on the adjustment made between the first and second definitive 
offers (F(1,214) = 2.19, p = n.s.). The significant differences between the two definitive offers 
are therefore likely caused by the counter offer made by the counterpart.’ 
Limitations 
One limitation of the current research may furthermore be the experimental design in 
which participants reacted to pre-programmed reactions instead of interacting with real peers. 
Some participants acknowledged that they knew the reactions were pre-programmed and that 
they might have reacted differently knowing that there was a real constituency. The fact that 
the participants did not meet their group members in person might also have caused insufficient 
identification with the group and hence may not have given representable reactions. Future 
research is therefore recommended to use a real life experimental design for the improvement 
of both the obtained results and the generalizability of this study’s findings.  
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Another limitation of the study was that some participants found the task and/or its 
explanation too hard to understand. Although the amount of people that have provided this 
feedback was not substantial enough to doubt the results of this research, future research is 
recommended to provide a simple as possible design which does not require too much 
explanation.  
Finally, this research was limited to the context of object negotiation rather than conflict solving 
negotiation. This means that the results of this research are possibly not generalizable to a 
conflict negotiation context. Future research focused on conflict negotiation is therefore advised 
to take into account the differences in meaning and context when considering to use this article’s 
findings for that purpose. 
Contributions and recommendations for future research 
Despite these limitations, this study provides a valuable contribution to the research on 
(representative) bargaining situations by showing new insights into how emotional feedback 
shapes bargaining representatives’ behaviors and how these interact with representatives’ 
SVOs. It was shown that negative emotions displayed by a constituency as a reaction to a 
proposed bid to an opponent lead to a lower and thus more disadvantageous and less 
competitive offer to the opponent party with both pro-social and pro-self representatives. 
Positive emotional displays on the other hand, were shown to lead to an adjustment of the 
proposal to a higher and hence more advantageous, more competitive offer. This research 
therewith serves as a steppingstone for future research by showing that choices are not merely 
influenced by stable traits and the actions of the counterpart, but also by the influences exerted 
by the constituency, and how. With regard to why representatives react on emotions of the 
constituency the way they do however, further research is recommended to focus on the reasons 
why representatives react on emotional feedback in these ways.  
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Inleiding en informed consent
Welkom bij ons onderzoek!
Wat leuk dat u mee wilt doen. Dit is een studie van vier studenten aan de Universiteit Leiden. Het
onderzoek richt zich op de manier waarop mensen onderhandelen, informatie verwerken en
beslissingen maken. Het onderzoek bestaat uit meerdere onderdelen; voor elke opdracht zal deze
worden uitgelegd. Wij vragen u niet te lang na te denken bij het maken van de opdrachten en af te
gaan op uw eerste ingeving. Over de resultaten en implicaties kunt u na het onderzoek informatie
opvragen. Dit kan door middel van het sturen van een e­mail naar het mailadres dat later op deze
pagina vermeld staat.
Voor u betekent deelname kans op één van de waardebonnen naar keuze van € 20,­ die onder iedere
20 deelnemers worden verloot. Deze loting vindt plaats aan het eind van dit onderzoek. Na afloop van
het onderzoek kunt u uw e­mailadres achterlaten om mee te dingen naar 1 van de waardebonnen.
Verdere informatie omtrent de loterij is aan het eind van het onderzoek beschikbaar. 
Het onderzoek wordt volledig online uitgevoerd en zal voor u ongeveer 15 minuten in beslag nemen.
Uw deelname is uiteraard vrijwillig en u bent dus vrij om op ieder moment te stoppen als u dat wenst.
De vragenlijst is niet goed op een smartphone in te vullen. Wij verzoeken u om die reden om een pc of
tablet te gebruiken.
Er dient een groep participanten samengesteld te worden die deelnemen aan het onderzoek. Dit kan
tot gevolg hebben dat er soms korte wachttijden zullen zijn. Wij vragen hiervoor uw begrip en geduld. 
Uw gegevens zullen geanonimiseerd en vertrouwelijk worden verwerkt, en worden niet verstrekt aan
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derden. In het belang van de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek vragen wij u om niet met anderen te
spreken over de inhoud van dit onderzoek.
Dit onderzoek wordt begeleid door Dr. Wolfgang Steinel (WSteinel@FSW.leidenuniv.nl), verbonden
aan de Universiteit Leiden. Voor vragen of opmerkingen kunt u contact opnemen met hem.
Alvast hartelijk dank voor uw tijd en deelname!
Met vriendelijke groet,
 
David, Jakob, Marinke en Claire
Lotingbon
Welke bon van € 20,­ zou je willen ontvangen als je wint?
Demografische gegevens
Voordat we beginnen aan het experiment, willen we graag een paar dingen weten.
Ja, ik stem toe met deelname Nee, ik stem niet toe met deelname
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Wat is je leeftijd?
Wat is je geslacht?
Hoe zou je je etniciteit omschrijven?
0  Jaar
Man
Vrouw
Transgender
Anders namelijk:
Autochtoon Nederlands
Turks
Marokkaans
Surinaams
Antilliaans
Iranees
Irakees
Afghaans
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In welk vakgebied ben je werkzaam of student?
SVO meting uitleg
Lees de volgende instructies aandachtig:
 
In deze taak vragen we je om je voor te stellen dat je random bent gekoppeld aan een ander persoon,
aan wie wij simpel gezegd zullen refereren als 'de ander'. Deze persoon is iemand die je niet kent en
waarvan je weet dat je hem nooit meer zal ontmoeten. Jij en 'de ander' zullen keuzes maken door te
klikken op een van de drie onderstaande kolommen. Jouw keuze zal punten opleveren voor jouzelf en
Anders, namelijk...
Sociale wetenschappen
Rechtsgeleerdheid
Geesteswetenschappen
Techniek
Economie
Taal
Medische
Ander namelijk:
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voor 'de ander'. Eveneens, de keuzes van 'de ander' leveren punten op voor hem/haar en voor jou.
Elke punt heeft waarde: hoe meer punten je ontvangt, hoe beter voor jou. En hoe meer punten 'de
ander' ontvangt, hoe beter voor hem/haar.
 
Dit is een kort voorbeeld hoe de taak werkt:
 
Jij krijgt:              500    500    550
De ander krijgt:   100    500    300
                             A       B       C
 
In dit voorbeeld, als jij A kiest dan krijg je 500 punten en de ander 100 punten; als je B kiest krijg je 500
punten en de ander 500; als je C kiest krijg jij 550 punten en de ander 300. 
 
Dus, zoals je ziet beïnvloedt de keuze die je maakt zowel het aantal punten dat jij krijgt, als het aantal
punten de ander krijgt. Voordat je begint met keuzen maken, hou er rekening mee dat er geen goede
of foute antwoorden zijn ­ kies de optie die je, om welke reden dan ook, de voorkeur geeft. Hou er ook
rekening mee dat de punten waarde hebben: hoe meer je er verzamelt, hoe beter voor jou. Eveneens,
vanuit het perspectief van 'de ander', hoe meer punten hij/zij verzamelt, hoe beter voor hem/haar.
Heb je de uitleg begrepen?
SVO Meting
Voor elke van de 9 keuze situatie, selecteer de kolom jouw grootste voorkeur heeft:
Ja Nee
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Ingroup
Bedankt voor het invullen, naar aanleiding van je resultaten ben je in de volgende test onderdeel van 
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
480
80
540
280
480
480
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
560
300
500
500
500
100
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
520
520
520
120
580
320
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
500
100
560
300
490
490
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
560
300
500
500
490
90
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
500
500
500
100
570
300
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
510
510
560
300
510
110
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
550
300
500
100
500
500
Jij krijgt:
de ander krijgt:
480
100
490
490
540
300
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een groep van vier deelnemers. 
 
Wij zullen je linken aan drie anderen die ook op dit moment online zijn: dit kan even duren.
 
Zodra u gekoppeld bent aan jouw groepsgenoten, zal er een vertegenwoordiger worden gekozen op 
basis van de test die u hiervoor heeft gedaan.
Waiting for Players
Even geduld alstublieft terwijl wij je matchen aan andere deelnemers...
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.
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Done Waiting
Dank voor je geduld, wij hebben nu voldoende deelnemers. Klik op de pijltjes om door te gaan 
Pre scenario ­ Ingroup
Je bent verkozen tot de vertegenwoordiger van je groep op basis van je eerdere testgegevens. 
 
Je zult een onderhandeling van een aantal rondes gaan voeren namens je groep.
 
Scenario ­ ingroup
Scenario
 
Een vereniging maakt samenvattingen voor verschillende cursussen en deelt deze samenvatting met
studenten via een tussenpersoon. Dit initiatief is al enkele jaren gaande en wordt erg gewaardeerd
onder alle studenten.
 
Om de vereniging draaiende te houden is het van belang om jaarlijks opnieuw te onderhandelen met
de tussenpersoon over de prijs van de samenvattingen. In de volgende onderhandeling wordt de
verkoopprijs van de bundels met samenvattingen voor het nieuwe kwartaal onderhandeld. 
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De vereniging moeten de samenvatting voor minimaal €200 verkopen aan de tussenpersoon, omdat
dit de kostprijs is. De maximum prijs die ze kunnen vragen om zelf geld te verdienen is €600, omdat de
tussenpersoon anders verlies lijdt.  
 
Het is jouw taak om de samenvattingen voor de vereniging te verkopen aan de tussenpersoon,
en daarbij te onderhandelen over de prijs.  
LET OP: Jouw kans om een prijs te winnen in de loterij hangt af van de tevredenheid van jouw
groepsleden na afloop van het experiment. Een goede uitkomst van de onderhandeling is dus ook in je
eigen belang!
After scenario
Je doet eerst een voorstel van een bod aan de groep. De groepsleden laten weten wat ze van jouw
bod vinden. De feedback van de groepsleden bestaat uit vooraf geselecteerde berichten. Zij kiezen
dus uit een set van voorgeprogrammeerde reacties.
 
Vervolgens doe je een definitief eerste bod aan de tegenstander. 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.
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Dan doet de tegenstander een bod, en daarna gaat de onderhandeling door zonder feedback van 
groepsleden.
 
Let op! Na dit scherm begint de onderhandeling.
Offer to group
Al het voorgaande in acht genomen, welk bod stel je voor aan de groep?
 
Vul hieronder een bedrag in tussen de €600 (de maximale vraagprijs) en €200 (de kostprijs).
Waiting for Feedback
Wachten op feedback van de groepsleden 1, 2 & 3.
 
Even geduld alstublieft...
0  €
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Emotional Feedback ­ Happy Bod 1
Wachten op feedback van de groepsleden 2 & 3...
Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, ik ben blij met dit bod.''
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.
10­5­2015 Qualtrics Survey Software
https://eu.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview&T=74L4lNHO4Xlpbo7e9ZRUdz 12/34
Emotional Feedback ­ Happy Bod 2
Wachten op feedback van de groepslid 3...
Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, ik ben blij met dit bod.''
Groepslid 2: ''Het bod bevalt me, het gaat goed tot nu toe.''
Emotional Feedback ­ Happy Bod 3
Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, ik ben blij met dit bod.''
Groepslid 2: ''Het bod bevalt me, het gaat goed tot nu toe.'' 
Groepslid 3:  ''Ik heb je bod gezien, ik ben er tevreden mee.''
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.
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Alle groepsleden hebben nu feedback gegeven, klik op de pijltjes om door te gaan.
Final first offer
Nu je feedback hebt gekregen doe je een definitief bod dat naar jouw tegenstander wordt verstuurd.
 
Vul hieronder een bedrag in tussen de €600 (de maximale vraagprijs) en €200 (de kostprijs).
Waiting for Opponent
Je tegenstander doet nu een bod.
 
Even geduld alstublieft...
0  €
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Offer opponent
Het bod van degene met wie je onderhandelt over de prijs is: 
 
€220,­
Final second offer
Je kunt nu een tegenbod doen.
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.
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Vul hieronder een bedrag in tussen de €600 (de maximale vraagprijs) en €200 (de kostprijs).
Identification Questionnaire
Dit was het einde van de onderhandeling, er zijn voldoende gegevens verzameld dus de
onderhandeling wordt niet afgerond. 
 
 
 
 
 
We zouden je willen vragen nog 3 korte vragenlijsten in te vullen.
 
De onderstaande vragenlijst gaat over de groep waarvoor jij onderhandelde in de voorgaande
opdracht. 
 
Vul deze aandachtig in alstublieft.
0  €
    
Sterk
oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk eens
Ik betreur vaak dat ik
bij mijn groep hoor   
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Over het algemeen
ben ik blij dat ik bij
mijn groep hoor
  
Ik voel vaak dat de
groep waar ik deel
van ben, mijn moeite
niet waard is.
  
Ik voel me goed over
de groep waar ik bij
hoor
  
Ik denk dat mijn groep
weinig heeft om trots
op te zijn
  
    
Sterk
oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk eens
Ik voel me goed over
mijn groep   
Ik heb weinig respect
voor mijn groep   
Ik zou liever niet
zeggen dat ik bij deze
groep hoor
  
Ik kan me
identificeren met
andere groepsleden
  
Ik ben net als de
andere leden van mijn   
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Manipulationcheck EmotionalFeedback &Self­interest
De reactie van de achterban op mijn voorgenomen bod was:
groep
    
Sterk
oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk eens
Mijn groep is een
goede representatie
van wie ik ben
  
Ik zou graag door
gaan met
samenwerken met
mijn groep
  
Ik vind het niet leuk
om deel te zijn van
mijn groep
  
Ik zou liever bij de
andere groep horen   
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
Negatief   
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Over het algemeen was de achterban:
Ik had persoonlijk baat bij:
Positief   
Gericht op mijn bod   
Gericht op mij als
persoon   
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
Tevreden   
Ontevreden   
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
Een zo hoog mogelijk
bod   
De hoogte van het
bod   
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Motivation ­ Ingroup ­ 1e bod
Nu volgt de laatste vragenlijst, deze heeft betrekking op de redenen van de gemaakte boden.
 
Mijn eerste bod (na feedback van mijn groep) is, ten opzichte van mijn voorgenomen bod: 
De reden hiervan was:
 
Geef aan per stelling of deze reden niet of wel belangrijk was voor jouw gemaakt keuze.
Gedaald
Gelijk gebleven
Gestegen
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
Mijn groep was
tevreden over mijn
bod
  
Ik wilde mijn groep
tevreden houden door
een meer competitief
bod te doen
  
Ik wilde mijn groep
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Motivation ­ Ingroup ­ 2e bod
Mijn tweede bod is, ten opzichte van mijn eerste bod:
tevreden houden door
een minder
competitief bod te
doen
  
Ik was het oneens
met mijn groep en
deed een meer
competitief bod
  
Ik was het oneens
met mijn groep en
deed een minder
competitief bod
  
Ik heb de reactie van
mijn groep niet
meegenomen in mijn
afweging en deed wat
mij zelf het beste leek
  
Gedaald
Gelijk gebleven
Gestegen
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De reden hier van was: 
 
Geef aan per stelling of deze reden niet of wel belangrijk was voor jouw gemaakt keuze.
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
Mijn groep was
tevreden over mijn
eerdere bod
  
Ik wilde mijn groep
tevreden houden door
een meer competitief
bod te doen
  
Ik wilde mijn groep
tevreden houden door
een minder
competitief bod te
doen
  
Ik was het oneens
met mijn groep en
deed een meer
competitief bod
  
Ik was het oneens
met mijn groep en
deed een minder
competitief bod
  
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
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Motivation Questionnaire
Voordat we naar de laatste vragenlijst gaan, willen we je vragen aan te geven hoe je motivatie was op
onderstaande schaal.
  
Ik heb de reactie van
mijn groep niet
meegenomen in mijn
afweging en deed wat
mij zelf het beste leek
  
Het tegenbod gaf
ruimte voor een
stijging van mijn bod
  
Het tegenbod vereiste
een daling van mijn
bod
  
Ik heb mij niets
aangetrokken van het
tegenbod en deed wat
mij zelf het beste leek
  
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
Ik vond de opdracht
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Beschrijf kort wat jij denkt dat het doel van dit onderzoek was. 
 
Maximaal 100 tekens
Debriefing & Endscreen
Dit is het einde van het onderzoek.
 
Beste deelnemer,
 
We hebben u in dit onderzoek gevraagd om een groep te vertegenwoordigen in een
onderhandelingssituatie. Wij hebben de achterban feedback laten geven nadat u een bod had
makkelijk.   
Ik heb me ingezet
tijdens de opdracht.   
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voorgesteld, en u daarna gevraagd twee definitieve biedingen te doen. U heeft
de onderhandelingstaak succesvol volbracht.
 
Het doel van dit onderzoek is om te kijken hoe het onderhandelingsgedrag van
groepsvertegenwoordigers verandert als reactie op de emoties die worden geuit door hun achterban.
Deze ‘reactie’ werd gemeten aan de hand van de aanpassing van het bod na het voorstel dat u deed
aan de achterban ten opzichte van de twee biedingen die u vervolgens deed aan de tegenpartij. We
hebben dus gekeken hoe u uw gedragsintentie aanpast aan de emotie die de groep over uw intentie
uit. Wij voorspellen dat uw sociale waarde oriëntatie (voorkeur geven aan de groep of aan uzelf), de
waarde die u hechtte aan uw groepslidmaatschap, het feit dat u wel of geen groepslid bent en het soort
emotie dat de achterban uitte, invloed heeft gehad op uw onderhandelingsgedrag. Op basis van deze
drie variabelen hebben wij condities gemaakt, en bent u in één van deze condities ingedeeld.
 
Om het onderzoek zo reëel mogelijk te laten lijken en te zorgen dat u overtuigd zou zijn dat het zou
gaan om echte emotionele reacties van anderen, zijn er een paar aspecten geweest in het onderzoek
die niet op waarheid waren gebaseerd. Allereerst was er geen echte achterban: de emotionele reacties
van de groep zijn vooraf geprogrammeerd om zeker te zijn dat alle participanten dezelfde reactie
zouden ontvangen. U bent dus ook niet geselecteerd als vertegenwoordiger op basis van de door u
eerder gemaakte onderhandelingstest, in tegenstelling tot wat een deel van u wel te horen heeft
gekregen. Deze test heeft u gedaan om te kijken wat uw sociale waarde oriëntatie is.
 
Daarnaast is een deel van u verteld dat de winkans voor de prijs ter waarde van €20 zou toenemen,
afhankelijk van de tevredenheid van uw groep. Dit hebben wij gedaan om te kijken wat de invloed is
van eigenbelang op het onderhandelingsgedrag van vertegenwoordigers. In werkelijkheid is dit niet het
geval: alle vier de prijzen zullen met gelijke kansen voor iedereen worden verloot.
 
Mocht u nog vragen of klachten hebben over het onderzoek, dan kunt u te allen tijde contact opnemen
met Dr. Wolfgang Steinel per e­mail: WSteinel@FSW.leidenuniv.nl.
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We bedanken u ontzettend voor uw tijd en deelname!
 
Voor het deelnemen aan de loting (klik hier voor de Algemene spelvoorwaarden) kunt u onderstaand
uw email­adres invullen:
 
Mocht u op­ of aanmerkingen hebben over dit onderzoek, dan kunt u dit hieronder aangeven.
 
LET OP! Vergeet niet op de pijlen te drukken om je email en gegevens te registreren.
 
Emotional Feedback ­ Anger Bod 1
Wachten op feedback van de groepsleden 2 & 3...
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Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, ik ben erg boos over 
dit bod.''
 
Emotional Feedback ­ Anger Bod 2
Wachten op feedback van groepslid 3...
 
Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, ik ben erg boos over 
dit bod.''
 
Groepslid 2:  ''Dit bod werkt echt op mijn zenuwen.''
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
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Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.
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Emotional Feedback ­ Anger Bod 3
Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, ik ben erg boos over 
dit bod.''
 
Groepslid 2:  ''Dit bod werkt echt op mijn zenuwen.''
 
Groepslid 3:  ''Ik heb je bod gezien, het maakt me pissig.''
Alle groepsleden hebben nu feedback gegeven, klik op de pijltjes om door te gaan.
Emotional Feedback ­ Anger Persoon 1
Wachten op feedback van de groepsleden 2 & 3...
Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, je maakt  
                       me erg boos.''
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
10­5­2015 Qualtrics Survey Software
https://eu.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview&T=74L4lNHO4Xlpbo7e9ZRUdz 28/34
Emotional Feedback ­ Anger Persoon 2
Wachten op feedback van groepslid 3...
Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, je maakt  
                       me erg boos.''
 
Groepslid 2:  ''Je werkt echt op mijn zenuwen.''
Emotional Feedback ­ Anger Persoon 3
Groepslid 1:  ''Ik heb gezien wat je intentie was om de andere groep te bieden, je maakt  
                       me erg boos.''
 
Click Count: 0 clicks.
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient.
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Groepslid 2:  ''Je werkt echt op mijn zenuwen.''
 
Groepslid 3:  ''Je hebt het niet goed gedaan, je maakt me pissig.''
Alle groepsleden hebben nu feedback gegeven, klik op de pijltjes om door te gaan.
outgroup
Bedankt voor het invullen, naar aanleiding van je resultaten ben je in de volgende test de 
vertegenwoordiger van een groep van drie personen.
 
Wij zullen je linken aan een groep die op dit moment online is: dit kan even duren.
Pre­Scenario Outgroup
Op basis van je eerder testgegevens is bepaald dat je een onderhandeling van een aantal rondes zult 
gaan voeren voor een groep die je vertegenwoordigt.
 
scenario ­ outgroup
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Scenario
 
Een vereniging maakt samenvattingen voor verschillende cursussen en deelt deze samenvatting met
studenten via een tussenpersoon. Dit initiatief is al enkele jaren gaande en wordt erg gewaardeerd
onder alle studenten.
 
Om de vereniging draaiende te houden is het van belang om jaarlijks opnieuw te onderhandelen met
de tussenpersoon over de prijs van de samenvattingen. In de volgende onderhandeling wordt de
verkoopprijs van de bundels met samenvattingen voor het nieuwe kwartaal onderhandeld. 
 
De vereniging moeten de samenvatting voor minimaal €200 verkopen aan de tussenpersoon, omdat
dit de kostprijs is. De maximum prijs die ze kunnen vragen om zelf geld te verdienen is €600, omdat de
tussenpersoon anders verlies lijdt.  
 
Het is jouw taak om namens de vereniging de samenvattingen te verkopen, en daarbij te
onderhandelen over de prijs met de verkoper. 
Motivation ­ Outgroup ­ 1e bod
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Nu volgt de laatste vragenlijst, deze heeft betrekking op de redenen van de gemaakte boden.
 
Mijn eerste bod (na feedback van mijn groep) is, ten opzichte van mijn voorgenomen bod: 
De reden hiervan was:
 
Geef aan per stelling of deze reden niet of wel belangrijk was voor jouw gemaakt keuze.
Gedaald
Gelijk gebleven
Gestegen
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
Mijn achterban was
tevreden over mijn
bod
  
Ik wilde mijn
achterban tevreden
houden door een
meer competitief bod
te doen
  
Ik wilde mijn
achterban tevreden
houden door een
minder competitief
bod te doen
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Motivation ­ Outgroup ­ 2e bod
Mijn tweede bod is, ten opzichte van mijn eerste bod:
De reden hier van was: 
 
Ik was het oneens
met mijn achterban en
deed een meer
competitief bod
  
Ik was het oneens
met mijn achterban en
deed een minder
competitief bod
  
Ik heb de reactie van
mijn achterban niet
meegenomen in mijn
afweging en deed wat
mij zelf het beste leek
  
Gedaald
Gelijk gebleven
Gestegen
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Geef aan per stelling of deze reden niet of wel belangrijk was voor jouw gemaakt keuze.
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
Mijn achterban was
tevreden over mijn
eerdere bod
  
Ik wilde mijn
achterban tevreden
houden door een
meer competitief bod
te doen
  
Ik wilde mijn
achterban tevreden
houden door een
minder competitief
bod te doen
  
Ik was het oneens
met mijn achterban en
deed een meer
competitief bod
  
Ik was het oneens
met mijn achterban en
deed een minder
competitief bod
  
    
Sterk
Oneens Oneens Neutraal Eens Sterk Eens
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Ik heb de reactie van
mijn achterban niet
meegenomen in mijn
afweging en deed wat
mij zelf het beste leek
  
Het tegenbod gaf
ruimte voor een
stijging van mijn bod
  
Het tegenbod vereiste
een daling van mijn
bod
  
Ik heb mij niets
aangetrokken van het
tegenbod en deed wat
mij zelf het beste leek
  
